The age of Internet of things gives rise to more challenges to various secure demands when designing the protocols, such as object identification and tracking, and privacy control. In many of the current protocols, a malicious server may cheat users as if it was a legal server, making it vital to verify the legality of both users and servers with the help of a trusted third-party, such as a registration center. Li et al. proposed an authentication protocol based on dynamic identity for multi-server environment, which is still susceptible to password-guessing attack, eavesdropping attack, masquerade attack, and insider attack etc. Besides, their protocol does not provide the anonymity of users, which is an essential request to protect users' privacy. In this article, we present an improved authentication protocol, depending on the registration center in multi-server environments to remedy these security flaws. Different from the previous protocols, registration center in our proposed protocol is one of parties in authentication phase to verify the legality of the users and the servers, thus can effectively avoid the server spoofing attack. Our protocol only uses nonce, exclusive-OR operation, and one-way hash function in its implementation. Formal analysis has been performed using the Burrows-AbadiNeedham logic to show its security.
Introduction
In the past decades, great research efforts have been made on Internet of things (IoT), and a wide range of application scenarios, such as object identification and tracking, healthcare, privacy control, and military. [1] [2] [3] [4] Along with the convenience they bring security issues of personal privacy in terms of the constant, and transparent leakage of private information may also arise. End-devices like smart cards often carry a certain level of infrastructure equivalent to a tiny computer, including the computation power, storage functionality, and communications, which make the mutual authentication and key agreement protocol possible. They can prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to sensitive resources and prevent legitimate users from accessing resources in an unauthorized manner.
Since Lamport 5 proposed the first password-based authentication protocol, great efforts have been made on the authentication to improve the security.
Password-based authentication is simple, but it needs to maintain the verification table and leads to table disclosure or password compromising. Hwang and Li   6 presented a new remote user authentication protocol with the help of smart cards based on the protocol proposed by ElGamal. 7 In their schemes, the servers do not need to keep any verification table. Since then, kinds of smart card-based authentication protocols with hash function have been presented. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] Traditional password-based or smart card-based authentication protocols are adapted in single-server environments and are not suitable for the multi-server environments. To overcome these weaknesses, many protocols for multi-server environment have been devised. [13] [14] [15] [16] They can implement mutual authentication with one registration. However, we find that they are still susceptible to replay attack, impersonation attack, password-guessing attack, and so on. To remedy these flaws, enhance security, and reduce the computational complexity, we propose an improved dynamic identity (ID) based on authentication protocol for multi-server architecture. This protocol not only achieves user's anonymity and resists various kinds of attacks, but also finishes the mutual authentication and session key agreement.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section ''Related work and discussion,'' we provide a brief review of related protocols and analyze their securities. Then, we present an improved authentication protocol for the multi-server environment in section ''The proposed protocol.'' The correctness of the proposed protocol is verified by performing formal verification with the Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic in section ''Analysis of correctness.'' Section ''Security analysis of the improved protocol'' evaluates the security of our proposed protocol. Section ''Cost and functionality analysis'' analyzes the costs and functionalities among ours and other protocols. Finally, we present the conclusion in section ''Conclusion.''
Related work and discussion
In the lectures, Liao and Wang 17 presented a secure user authentication protocol for multi-server architectures based on dynamic ID. However, Hsiang et al. claimed that Liao et al.'s protocol not only failed to achieve mutual authentication but also could not withstand server spoofing attack, insider attack, masquerade attack, and so on. Moreover, Lee et al. 18 proposed an improved remote user authentication scheme based on dynamic ID, but their protocol is still vulnerable to server spoofing attack and forgery attack. Hsiang et al. presented a new authentication protocol. 19 They claimed that their protocol efficiently protects the identity of the user and can resist various known attacks. Unfortunately, Sood et al. 20 24 uncovered two other vulnerabilities: offline password-guessing attack and no provision of user's anonymity. In recent years, many researchers also studied group data sharing via cloud storage or new preserving encryption model in cloud environments.
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Review of Li et al.'s protocol
In this section, we mainly review the authentication protocol presented by Li et al. 21 This protocol consists of three parties: the user U i , the server S j , and the registration center RC. It is known that RC is trusted for U i and S j , and they can register in it and authenticate with it. RC chooses a master key x and a secret number y. When S j registers in RC, RC calculates h(SID j k y) and h(x k y), then submits h(x k y) and h(SID j k y) to S j over a secure channel. Their protocol can be divided into four phases: registration phase, login phase, authentication and session key agreement phase, and password change phase. The notations are listed in Table 1 .
Registration phase.
Step 1: U i chooses his or her identity ID i and password P i freely and chooses a random number b. Then U i calculates A i = h(b k P i ), and sends A i and ID i to RC over a secure channel.
Step 2: Upon receiving ID i and A i , RC computes
, and then stores {C i , D i , E i , h(Á), h(y)} into the smart card. Finally, RC sends them to the user over a secure channel.
Step 3: U i keys b into the smart card.
Login phase.
Step 1: When U i wants to login S j , U i inserts the smart card into a card reader, and then keys ID i , P i , and SID j . The smart card computes
and then checks whether C 0 i is equal to C i . If they are equal, the user is legal, otherwise the user is illegal.
Step 2: After local verification, the smart card generates a random number N i1 and computes
Authentication and session key agreement phase.
Step 1: Upon receiving the login request from the user, S j chooses a random number N i2 and computes
Step 2: Once RC receives the login request from S j , it computes
) and then checks whether M 0 i is equal to M i or not. If it holds, RC authenticates the server successfully. Otherwise, RC terminates the session.
Step 3:
If it holds, the legality of S j is verified by RC. Otherwise, RC terminates the session.
Step 4: RC generates a random number N i3 , and computes
and
Then RC submits the mutual authentication message to S j .
Step 5: On receiving the mutual authentication message,
) and checks whether V 0 i is equal to V i . If they are not equal, S j terminates the session. Otherwise, S j authenticates RC successfully and sends V i , T i f gto the user.
Step 6: Upon receiving messages from S j , the smart card computes
and then checks whether V 0 i = V i . If it holds, RC and S j are legal for U i . Otherwise, U i terminates the session.
Finally, U i , S j , and RC agree on
Password change phase. When U i wants to change his or her password P i to a new password P new i , U i can make it by his or her own smart card with no need of RC involvement. The user inserts it into a card reader and keys ID i and P i . The smart card computes 
Cryptanalysis of Li et al.'s protocol
Li et al. stated that their protocol could resist kinds of security attacks; however, we find that their protocol is still vulnerable to many attacks, such as insider attack, smart card forgery attack, eavesdropping attack, masquerade attack, and offline password-guessing attack, which are detailed as the following.
Insider attack. If an adversary is a malicious legal user, he or she is able to extract h(y) from his or her own smart card. Then he or she can compute his or her own
Having known h(y k x) and h(y), the adversary can launch eavesdropping attacks to get the session key shared among another users, the related servers, and RC.
Smart card forgery attack. For Li et al.'s scheme is lack of RC's authentication to A i and B i , so a malicious attacker can get h(y) and h(y k x). As a result, the attacker can fabricate a new smart card. If an attacker wants to fabricate U s 's smart card, he must first choose two random parameters A s = N um1 and B s = N um2 . If the attacker makes use of the fabricated smart card to get services from S j . The necessary messages are computed as follows
In Li et al.'s scheme, these messages can be verified by S j and RC successfully. If S j and RC generate two random numbers N s2 and N s3 , respectively, S j and RC agree on
Eavesdropping attack. As a malicious legal user, he or she can use his or her own smart card to attain h(y) and h(y k x). The adversary intercepts F m , G m , P mn , CID m f g sent to the server by U m , and then computes N m1 = h(y) k F m with F m and N m1 . In addition, E m , B m , and A m can be easily acquired by
It can be seen that the critical secure information {A m , B m , N m1 } can be obtained by the messages transmitted in the public channel. And the parameter E m can also be attained. Even though the adversary cannot compute C m and D m without the user's ID, he or she can get
Then the adversary can get the agreement session key among U m , S n , and RC.
Masquerade attack. From the eavesdropping attack mentioned above, the adversary obtains a legal user U m 's information and pretends to be another legal user to conduct malicious attack. He can get h(y) and h(y k x) by insider attack, further get A m , B m , and E m by eavesdropping attack. With these messages, the adversary can masquerade as a legitimate user U m to launch authentication and session key agreement phase.
First, the adversary chooses a random number N MA freely and calculates these parameters
Then, S p and RC think these messages are legal and generate random numbers N m2 and N m3 , respectively. Finally, the adversary, S p and RC agree on
Therefore, S p and RC mistakenly think that they are communicating with a legitimate user.
Server-spoofing attack. First, a malicious attacker intercepts the messages K i and M i transmitted by S n . We can assume that U m 's information is revealed to a malicious attacker because of insider attack and eavesdropping attack. When U m logins S n , he or she chooses a random number N m1 and sends {F m , G m , P mn , CID m } to S n . The attacker masquerades S n to compute K i and M i , then sends {F m , G m , P mn , CID m , SID n , K i , M i } to RC. The message transmitted by the attacker can also be authenticated by RC. Finally, U m and RC agree on
Unfortunately, U m thinks that he or she is communicating with a legitimate S n . Although the attacker cannot extract N i2 from K i , he or she can still obtain the correct session key. Therefore, the attacker can not only masquerade as a legitimate server but also encrypt and decrypt user's database.
User's anonymity. A malicious server S k and a malicious inside user U m could destroy the anonymity of any legal user. U m extracts h(y) and h(y k x) from his or her own smart card and attains a user's E i using a previous login message P ik , SID k f g . U m can intercept F i from the public channel. Thus U m can compute N i1 = F i È h(y) and
As we all know, every legal user has a unique E i because of E i = h(ID i k x) È h(y k x), thus Li et al.'s scheme has no provision of user's anonymity.
Offline password-guessing attack. If the smart card of a legal user U i 's is stolen by a malicious inside user U m , U m can extract the secret values {h(y), D i , E i , b} stored in the smart card. With previous login message {F i , G i , P ij , CID i , SID j , K i , M i }, U m can guess U i 's password as follows. First, U m extracts h(y) from his or her own smart card and then computes N i1 = F i È h(y) with F i . Second, U m makes use of P ij and SID j to compute 
The proposed protocol
This proposed protocol also consists of four phases. In the protocol, the server has only one private key, which can effectively resist server spoofing attack. The mutual authentication among user, server, and registration center can achieve multiple security goals.
Registration phase
If a user wants to get services from servers, he or she shall register in RC in advance. The registration phase is shown in Figure 1 , and detailed steps are illustrated as follows.
Step 1: U i chooses ID i , P i and b and computes A i = h(b k P i k ID i ). Then, U i transmits ID i and A i to RC over a secure channel.
, and E i = B i È h(y k A i ) and stores {C i , D i , E i , h(Á), h(y)} into the smart card. At last, RC sends the smart card to U i through a secure channel.
Step 3: Upon receiving the smart card, U i keys b into it. Finally, the smart card contains parameters {C i ,
Login phase
In the phase, U i can login S j to get services with the registration information and the smart card. The detailed login phase is illuminated in Figure 2 .
Step 1: When U i wants to login S j , he or she inserts the smart card into a card reader, and then keys ID i , P i , and the server's identity SID j . The smart card computes A i = h(b k P i k ID i ) and C 0 i = h(ID i k h(y) k A i ) and then checks whether C 0 i is equal to C i . If it holds, the user is legal. Otherwise, the user is illegal.
, and
, based on the value of E i stored in it. The smart card generates a random number a, and computes
Then it sends {F i , G i , P ij , CID i } to S j over a public channel.
Authentication and session key generation phase
RC validates the legality of S j and U j , and they generate mutual authentication messages. This phase is depicted in Figure 3 , and we illustrated it as the following.
Step 2: Once RC receives the login request, it computes N i2 = K i È h(SID j k y) and M 0 i = h(h(x k y) k N i2 ) and then checks whether M i is equal to M i . If it holds, RC can authenticate the server successfully. Otherwise, RC terminates the session.
) and checks whether G 0 i is equal to G i . If they are equal, S j is legal for RC. Otherwise, RC terminates the session.
Step 4: RC generates a random number N i3 and computes Then RC transmits the mutual authentication message to S j .
Step 5: Once S j receives the mutual authentication message, it computes
) and checks whether V 0 i is equal to V i . If they are not, S j terminates the session. Otherwise S j authenticates RC successfully. After authentication, S j sends V i , T i f g to U i .
Step 6: Upon receiving the message from S j , the smart card computes 
Password change phase U i inserts the smart card into a card reader and inputs ID i and P i . The smart card computes
, and 
Analysis of correctness
First of all, we can prove the correctness of the protocol using the BAN logic. 28 Through specific logic analysis, it can be proved that the protocol can not only achieve session key agreement among users, servers, and RC but also realize mutual authentication among them. According to the BAN logic, every step must be converted into a specific form of the agreement.
BAN logic notation
The notations for BAN logic are listed as the following. 29 1. Pj[X : P believes X . 2. P / X : P sees X . 3. Pj;X : P said X . 4. Pj ) X : P controls X . 5. #(X ) : X is fresh.
6. P $ K Q: K is the key shared by P and Q, and only P and Q, the users authorized by them can get K.
7. j ! K P: K is the public key of P.
P ,
X Q: X is the public key shared by P and Q, and only P and Q know K. 9. fX g K : the ciphertext of X encrypted by the key K. 10. \X . Y : X is connected with Y .
BAN logical postulates
To prove feasibility and correctness of the protocol, the BAN logic needs to set some special rules to complete the authentication protocol analysis and reasoning. The rules used in the article are as follows.
R1: Message-meaning rule
If P believes that the key K is shared by P and Q and sees X encrypted under K, P believes that Q once said X . R2: Nonce-verification rule
If P believes that X could have been uttered only recently and that Q once said X , P believes that Q believes X .
R3: Jurisdiction rule
If P believes that Q can control X , P trusts Q on the truth of P believes X . R4: Freshness rule
If P believes that one part X of a formula is fresh, then the entire formula (X , Y ) must also be fresh.
Logic premises
Based on the aforementioned, we can obtain the initiative premises as below
Correctness analysis using BAN logic
In this protocol, three messages are used to achieve key agreements and mutual authentications. The first one is sent to RC for login request, and the second one is sent by RC to the server to get verification information. The last one is also the verification information sent to the user. The analysis is illuminated as the following.
Message1
S j ! RC :
The basic believes are as follows.
Based on the above assumptions, the agreement can be converted to BAN logic in specific patterns. The specific logic proved as follows:
RC receives message 1, which can be expressed as
Based on A13, equation (20) , and R1, we can obtain
Then S j receives message 2, which can be expressed as
and they can be converted as
Based on A10, A11, equation (23), and R2, we can obtain
Based on A9, equation (27) , and R1, we can obtain
Based on A9, equation (24) , and R1, we can obtain
Based on A10, A11, equation (29), and R2, we can obtain
Based on A9, equation (25) , and R1, we can obtain
Based on A10, A11, equation (31), and R2, we can obtain
Based on A10, A11, equation (26), and R2, we can obtain
Based on A9, equation (33), and R1, we can obtain
Finally, U i receives message 3, which can be expressed as
Then they can be converted as
Based on A3, equation (33), and R2, we can obtain
Based on A3, equation (34), and R2, we can obtain
Finally, based on R2, it can be proved that
Hence, the improved protocol can achieve mutual authentication among the user, the server and RC as shown in equations (12) , (21) , (32), and (38). The three parties of the protocol also achieve session key agreement as shown in equations (40), (41), (32), (33), (34), and (35).
Security analysis of the improved protocol
Compared with other related protocols, our protocol can resist much more attacks illuminate as the following.
Leak of verifier attack
Different from some other protocols, registration center is involved in the authentication, and session key agreement phase. There is no verification table in both the registration center and the servers in our protocol, so it can avoid leak of verifier attack.
User's anonymity
When U i logins the system, the smart card generates a random number a and encrypts the number E i by E i 0 = E i È a. RC computes E i 0 by the login request message to verify U i . Even though the attacker eavesdrops the message transmitted in the public channel and computes E i 0 , the attacker still cannot get E i which is unique to every user. Thus, user's anonymity is protected in our protocol.
Insider attack
After registering in RC, S j gets h(SID j k y) and h(x k y), and both of them are used to compute the login request submitted to RC, with neither of them participating in the computation of the user's login request message. Besides, as a trusted party, RC will not reveal the user's information to the server. Hence, our protocol can resist insider attacks.
Eavesdropping attack
Even if the adversary intercepts the message {F i , G i , P ij , CID i , K i , M i } that S j transmits to RC, and computes
, without knowing the secret number y, the adversary still cannot compute
) consistent with S j and RC. Thus, our protocol can withstand eavesdropping attack.
Masquerade attack
Even though a malicious user can extract h(y) from his or her own smart card, he or she cannot obtain U i 's ID ID i and password P i . Thus, the attacker cannot know
, and achieve
) consistent with S j and RC. To sum up, the attacker cannot masquerade U i to login the system; therefore, our protocol is resistant to masquerade attack.
Offline password-guessing attack
When a malicious legal user intercepts the login message {F i , G i , P ij , CID i , K i , M i } transmitted to RC by S j , he or she can compute N i1 = F i È h(y) and A i = P ij È h(h(y) k N i1 k SID j ) based on h(y) in the smart card. However, the attacker still cannot guess U i 's identity ID i and password P i for A i = h(b k P i k ID i ). Therefore, our protocol is immune to offline passwordguessing attack.
Stolen smart card attack
If a user's smart card is lost or stolen, the adversary is able to extract the parameters stored in the smart card. Unfortunately, the adversary does not know the user's ID i and P i , he or she cannot pretend U i to login the system. To sum up, our protocol can resist stolen smart card attack.
Cost and functionality analysis
In this section, we evaluate the computational costs and functionality of our proposed protocol and compare it with some related authentication protocols for multiserver environment. To analyze the computational complexity, let T h denote the time complexity of hashing function, T k be the time complexity of bitwise concatenation operation, and T xor be the time complexity of bitwise exclusive-OR operation. Table 2 shows the performance comparisons among our proposed protocol and some other related protocols. It can be seen that our protocol is more secure, when the computational complexity is similar to Li et al.'s protocol. Table 3 lists the functionality comparisons among our proposed protocol and other related protocols, which shows that our protocol can resist replay attack, stolen smart card attack, and password-guessing attack, and so on. Besides, the proposed protocol has achieved the security performances, such as proper mutual authentication, correct session key generation, user's anonymity, and free password changing. These features make our protocol have a high level of security and efficiency.
Conclusion
In this article, we investigate Li et al.'s dynamic IDbased authentication protocol for multi-server architecture and show that Li et al.'s protocol is susceptible to certain security issues including insider attack, stolen smart card attack, eavesdropping attack, masquerade attack, no provision of user's anonymity, and password-guessing attack. In order to address these issues, we propose an improved authentication protocol based on dynamic ID, and it is dependent on registration center for multi-server environments. Compared with other related schemes, our protocol remedies the Table 2 . Cost comparisons of our protocol and other related protocols.
Protocols
Login phase Verification phase Total secure flaws existing in Li et al.'s protocol with a minor increase in computational complexity. In addition, we provide the correctness analysis by using BAN logic.
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